




We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for
one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where
players’ marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining.
J   C             : D44, D82, J31, J41.
K       : Multi-prize contests, All-pay auctions.
1 Introduction
In winner-take-all contests, all contestants including those who do not win the prize, incur costs as a result of
their eﬀorts. However, only the winner receives the prize. Winner-take-all contests have been applied to many
settings including, rent-seeking and lobbying in organizations, R&D races, political contests, promotions in
labor markets, trade wars, military conﬂicts and biological wars of attrition. The most common winner
take-all contest is the all-pay auction. In the all-pay auction each player submits a bid (eﬀort) for the prize
and the player who submits the highest bid receives the prize, but, independently of success, all players
bear the cost of their bids. In the economic literature, all-pay auctions are usually studied under complete
information where each player’s value for the prize is common knowledge,1 or under incomplete information
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1where each player’s value for the prize is private information to that player and only the distribution of
the players’ values is common knowledge.2 Most of this literature has focused on all-pay auctions with a
single prize which is awarded to the player with the highest bid.3 In the real world, however, we can ﬁnd
numerous contests with several prizes where the prizes can be awarded either simultaneously or sequentially.
Some examples would be where employees spend eﬀort in order to be promoted in organizational hierarchies
which often consist of several types of well-deﬁned positions, and competition settings such as where students
compete for grades in exams.
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium behavior in sequential two-prize all-pay auctions under complete
information where the prizes are identical. Each player may win more than one prize. Players’ marginal
values for the ﬁrst and the second prize are either declining or inclining. Because it is possible to win more
than one prize our model is more complicated than the standard one-prize all-pay auction. In one-prize
contests, the players’ strategies are quite simple since the players have only two options, either to win the
prize or to lose it, while in sequential multi-prize contests more complex strategies are involved since each
player may win more than one prize and therefore players may face many options that depend on the identity
of the winner in each stage, and each of these options may have a diﬀerent eﬀect on the chance of each player
to win the other prizes in the later stages. In particular, in sequential multi-prize contests, each player has to
decide in which stages he will compete to win and in which stages he will quit and keep his eﬀort (resources)
for the other rounds. In our sequential two-prize all pay auction with two players, we ﬁnd a sub-game perfect
equilibrium where no player quits in the ﬁrst stage such that both players compete to win both of the prizes.
The players use mixed strategies in both stages and therefore each has the chance to win both the prizes as
well as none of them. The players’ behavior in the second stage is similar to that of the one-prize all-pay
auction, but their behavior in the ﬁrst stage is completely unique in our sequential contest. For example, in
contrast to the one-prize all-pay auction, in our sequential model even if a player is weaker than the other
players (he has lower marginal values than those of his opponents) he may have a positive expected payoﬀ
2See, for example, Hillman and Riley (1989), Amman and Leininger (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1998), Gavious, Moldovanu
and Sela (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
3Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) provided a complete characterization of equilibrium behavior in the complete informa-
tion all-pay auction with one prize.
2in the ﬁrst stage of the contest.
In multi-prize contests, the literature has focused on the optimal prize structure.4 In ﬁxed-prize contests,
the designer can determine the number of prizes having a positive value and the distribution of the ﬁxed total
prize sum among the diﬀerent prizes. In all-pay auctions with complete information, Barut and Kovenock
(1998) show that the revenue maximizing prize structure allows any combination of n−1 prizes, where n is
the number of contestants. In particular, allocating the entire prize sum to a unique ﬁrst prize is optimal.
On the other hand, Cohen and Sela (2008) show that in all-pay auctions under complete information where
players have asymmetric values for the prizes, allocation of several prizes might be proﬁtable for the contest
designer who maximizes the total eﬀort. In an all-pay auction with incomplete information, Moldovanu and
Sela (2001) show that when cost functions are linear or concave in eﬀort, it is optimal to allocate the entire
prize sum to a single ”ﬁrst” prize but when cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal.
Che and Gale (2003) study a contest where the contestants choose a prize from a menu of ﬁxed prizes and
the winner is determined according to the best combination of eﬀort and prize. Cohen, Kaplan and Sela
(2007) study all-pay auctions with eﬀort-dependent rewards under incomplete information. They ﬁnd that
when the designer maximizes total eﬀort and there is a suﬃciently large number of contestants, the optimal
reward decreases in the contestants’ eﬀort. They also ﬁnd that the designer’s payoﬀ depends only upon the
expected value of the eﬀort-dependent rewards and not on the number of rewards.
Another important issue dealt with in the literature concerning the allocation of prizes in contests is
whether to distribute the prizes simultaneously or sequentially. Clark and Riis (1998) analyze contests with
multiple identical prizes and compare simultaneous versus sequential designs from the point of view of a
revenue-maximizing designer. They show that if there is a dominant player (one who has a much higher
value than his colleagues) a designer would maximize the expected total bid in the contest by distributing
prizes simultaneously, whereas if no player were dominant, the designer would prefer a sequential distribution.
The point common to the papers on multi-prize contests mentioned above is that in all of them a player
can win only one prize, while, as was already mentioned, in our sequential two-prize all-pay auction, every
player may win more than one prize.
4The tournament literature has shown how prizes based on rank-orders of performance can be eﬀectively used to provide
incentives (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Green and Stokey, 1983, and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz, 1983).
3The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce our sequential two-prize all pay auction.
In Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium behavior in two-player contests where players’ marginal values are
declining, and in Section 4 we analyze the equilibrium behavior in two-player contests where players’ marginal
values are inclining. In Section 5 we show the generalization of our results to the case with more than two
players. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a sequential all-pay auction with n players and two prizes. Player i′s value for the prizes is
given by the vector V i = (v1,v2), where vj represents the marginal value of obtaining the j-th prize. That
is, if player i wins only one prize his value is v1 and if he wins two prizes his value is v1 + v2. We assume
that all players’ marginal values are either declining or inclining and they are common knowledge.
Each player i submits a bid (eﬀort) x ∈ [0,∞) in the ﬁrst stage. The player with the highest bid wins
the ﬁrst prize and all the players pay their bids. All the players know the identity of the winner in the ﬁrst
stage before the beginning of the second stage. In other words, the players’ values in the second stage are
common knowledge. The player with the highest bid in the second stage wins the second prize and all the
players pay their bids.
3 The second stage
Assume that player i’s marginal value in the second stage is vi, and without loss of generality assume that
the players’ marginal values satisfy, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ vl for all l  = 1,2. According to Baye, Kovenock and de Vries
(1993,1996), there is always a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which all the players except players 1 and 2
stay out of the contest. Players 1 and 2 randomize on the interval [0,v2] according to their eﬀort cumulative
distribution functions, which are given by
v1F2(x) − x = v1 − v2
v2F1(x) − x = 0




while player 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
F2(x) =
v1 − v2 + x
v1
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1−v2 and u2 = 0. Hence, in the second stage, the expected payoﬀs
of all the players except the player with the highest value are zero and the expected payoﬀ of the player
with the highest value is equal to the diﬀerence between the two highest values. Now, given the equilibrium
strategies in the second stage we can analyze the equilibrium strategies in the ﬁrst stage.
4 The ﬁrst stage - declining values
In this section, we analyze an equilibrium in which all the players compete in the ﬁrst stage to win the ﬁrst
prize. An important point of the equilibrium analysis is that if a player competes in the ﬁrst stage, his
expected payoﬀ in this stage should be larger or equal to his expected payoﬀ if he would quit in the ﬁrst
stage and compete only in the second stage.
Assume ﬁrst that there are only two players, 1 and 2 with values V 1 and V 2, and for each player the
marginal values are declining. Suppose that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. As such, we arrive at the following three
possible cases.
4.1 Case A1: V 1 = (v1,v4), V 2 = (v2,v3).
Proposition 1 Consider a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players where the players’ marginal





5while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x + v3 − v4
v3
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v4 and u2 = v2 − v4.
Proof. If player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v1, but if he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage, his
expected payoﬀ in the second stage is v1 − v3. Similarly, if player 2 wins in the ﬁrst stage, his payoﬀ is v2
but if he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage his expected payoﬀ in the next stage is v2 − v4. Hence, the players
randomize on the interval [0,v4] according to their eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x),
which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
v1F2(x) + (v1 − v3)(1 − F2(x)) − x = v1 − v4
v2F1(x) + (v2 − v4)(1 − F1(x)) − x = v2 − v4
In this situation, both players have positive expected payoﬀs in the ﬁrst stage. Player 2’s expected payoﬀ
in the ﬁrst stage, v2 −v4, is equal to his expected payoﬀ if he would quit in the ﬁrst stage and compete only
in the second stage. Player 1’s expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage, v1 − v4, is larger than his highest possible
expected payoﬀ in the second stage which is v1 − v3. Thus, both players have incentives to compete in the
ﬁrst stage. Note that player 1’s expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage decreases in his second marginal value, v4,
since the the probability that player 2 will stay out of the contest in the ﬁrst stage increases in the value of
v4.
4.2 Case A2: V 1 = (v1,v3), V 2 = (v2,v4).
Proposition 2 Consider a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players where the players’ marginal
values are V 1 = (v1,v3), V 2 = (v2,v4),v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. Then, type 1’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed
according to
F1(x) =
x + v3 − v4
v3





6The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v4 and u2 = v2 − v4.
Proof. If player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v1 but if he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage, his
expected payoﬀ in the second stage is v1 − v4. Similarly, if player 2 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v2,
but if he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage his expected payoﬀ in the next stage is v2 − v3. Hence, the players
randomize on the interval [0,v4] according to their eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x),
which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
v1F2(x) + (v1 − v4)(1 − F2(x)) − x = v1 − v4
v2F1(x) + (v2 − v3)(1 − F1(x)) − x = v2 − v4
The players’ expected payoﬀs are exactly as in case A1, but they have the opposite strategies with respect
to case A1, namely, player 1 uses player 2’s strategy, and player 2 uses player 1’s strategy. It is interesting
that player 1, the stronger player in this case (he has the highest marginal value in each stage), chooses an
eﬀort of zero with a probability of v3−v4
v3 . The reason is that player 1’s expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage is
the same as if player 1 would compete only in the second stage. Thus, he is indiﬀerent between whether to
stay out or to compete in the ﬁrst stage.
Similar to case A1, player 2’s expected payoﬀ decreases in his second marginal value v4, since the prob-
ability that player 1 will stay out of the contest in the ﬁrst stage increases in v4.
4.3 Case A3: V 1 = (v1,v2), V 2 = (v3,v4).
Proposition 3 Consider a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players where the players’ marginal
values are V 1 = (v1,v2), V 2 = (v3,v4), v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4.




while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x + v2 + v4 − 2v3
v2 + v4 − v3
.
7The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 + v2 − 2v3 and u2 = 0.
2) If v2 + v4 < 2v3, then, type 1’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F1(x) =
x + 2v3 − v2 − v4
v3
while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x
v2 + v4 − v3
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v4 and u2 = 2v3 − v2 − v4.
Proof. If player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v1 and then he also has an expected payoﬀ in the
second stage of v2 − v3. If player 1 doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage, his expected payoﬀ in the second stage is
v1 −v4. If player 2 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v3, but if he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage his expected
payoﬀ in the next stage is zero.
Hence, if v2 + v4 ≥ 2v3 the players randomize on the interval [0,v3] according to their eﬀort cumulative
distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x), which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
(v1 + v2 − v3)F2(x) + (v1 − v4)(1 − F2(x)) − x = v1 + v2 − 2v3
v3F1(x) − x = 0
Similarly, if v2 + v4 − 2v3 < 0, the players randomize on the interval [0,v2 + v4 − v3] according to their
eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x), which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
(v1 + v2 − v3)F2(x) + (v1 − v4)(1 − F2(x)) − x = v1 − v4
v3F1(x) − x = 2v3 − v2 − v4
If v2 + v4 ≥ 2v3, player 1’s marginal values are larger than those of player 2, such that player 2 doesn’t
have any chance to win in each of the stages and therefore his expected payoﬀ is zero. Note that player 1
has an incentive to compete in the ﬁrst stage, since if he quits in the ﬁrst stage and competes only in the
second stage he will win v1 − v4 which is smaller than his expected payoﬀ v1 + v2 − 2v3 in the ﬁrst stage
given our condition that v2 + v4 ≥ 2v3.
8If v2+v4 < 2v3, player 1 has an expected payoﬀ of v1−v4 in the ﬁrst stage which is equal to his expected
payoﬀ if he competes only in the second stage. Thus, player 1 is indiﬀerent between staying out or competing
in the ﬁrst stage, and he chooses each of these options with a positive probability. Consequently, player 2
has a positive expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage although he is weaker than player 1 given that both of his
marginal values are smaller than both of player 1’s marginal values.
Based on cases A1, A2 and A3 we obtain the following result:
Conclusion 1 In sequential two-prize all-pay auctions with two players where the players’ marginal values
are declining, the player with the highest marginal value has the higher expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage which
is larger or equal to the diﬀerence between the highest and lowest marginal values of the players.
5 The ﬁrst stage - inclining values
We assume now that there are only two players, 1 and 2 with values V 1 and V 2 respectively, and for each
player the marginal values are inclining. Suppose that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. As such we arrive at the following
three possible cases.
5.1 Case B1: V 1 = (v2,v1), V 2 = (v4,v3).
Proposition 4 Consider a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players where the players’ marginal





while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x + v1 + v3 − 2v4
v1 + v3 − v4
.
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 + v2 − 2v4 and u2 = 0.
Proof. If player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v2 and then he also has an expected payoﬀ in the
second stage of v1 − v4. If player 1 doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage, his expected payoﬀ in the second stage is
9v2 −v3. If player 2 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v4, but if he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage his expected
payoﬀ in the next stage is zero. Hence, the players randomize on the interval [0,v4] according to their eﬀort
cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x), which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
(v2 + (v1 − v4))F2(x) + (v2 − v3)(1 − F2(x)) − x = v1 + v2 − 2v4
v4F1(x) − x = 0
In this case, player 1 competes in the ﬁrst stage since he knows that he has the highest value in the second
stage. This situation leaves player 2, the weaker player (he has lower marginal values), with an expected
proﬁt of zero in both stages.
5.2 Case B2: V 1 = (v3,v1), V 2 = (v4,v2).
Proposition 5 Consider a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players where the players’ marginal




v4 + v2 − v3
while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x + v1 − v2 + 2(v3 − v4)
v4 + v2 − v3
.
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v2 + 2(v3 − v4) and u2 = 0.
Proof. If player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v3 and then he also has an expected payoﬀ of
v1 −v4 in the second stage. If player 1 doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage, his expected payoﬀ in the second stage
is zero. If player 2 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v4 and then he also has an expected payoﬀ of v2−v3. If
he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage his expected payoﬀ in the next stage is zero. Hence, the players randomize
on the interval [0,v2 +v4 −v3] according to their eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x),
which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
(v3 + (v1 − v4))F2(x) − x = v1 − v2 + 2(v3 − v4)
(v4 + (v2 − v3)F1(x) − x = 0
10Here player 1 knows that he is stronger than his opponent in the ﬁrst stage and that he will be even
stronger in the second stage. Thus, he competes in the ﬁrst stage and tries to win the ﬁrst prize. Therefore,
player 2 (like in case B1) will not have a positive expected proﬁt in both stages of the contest.
5.3 Case B3: V 1 = (v4,v1), V 2 = (v3,v2).
Proposition 6 Consider a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players where the players’ marginal
values are V 1 = (v4,v1), V 2 = (v3,v2), v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4.
1) If 2v4 + v1 ≥ 2v3 + v2, then, type 1’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F1(x) =
x
v3 + v2 − v4
while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x + v1 − v2 + 2(v4 − v3)
v4 + v1 − v3
.
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v2 − 2(v3 − v4) ≥ 0 and u2 = 0.
2) If 2v4 + v1 < 2v3 + v2, then, type 1’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F1(x) =
x + v2 − v1 + 2(v3 − v4)
v2 + v3 − v4
while type 2’s equilibrium eﬀort is distributed according to
F2(x) =
x
v4 − v3 + v1
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = 0 and u2 = v2 − v1 + 2(v3 − v4) > 0.
Proof. If player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v4 and then he also has an expected payoﬀ of
v1 −v3 in the second stage. If player 1 doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage, his expected payoﬀ in the second stage
is zero. Similarly, if player 2 wins in the ﬁrst stage his payoﬀ is v3 and then he also has an expected payoﬀ
of v2 − v4. If he doesn’t win in the ﬁrst stage his expected payoﬀ in the next stage is zero.
11Hence, if v4+(v1−v3) ≥ v3+(v2−v4), the players randomize on the interval [0,v3+v2−v4] according to
their eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x), which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
(v4 + (v1 − v3))F2(x) − x = v1 − v2 − 2(v3 − v4)
(v3 + (v2 − v4))F1(x) − x = 0
If v4+(v1−v3) < v3+(v2−v4), the players randomize on the interval [0,v4+v1−v3] according to their
eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x), which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
(v4 + (v1 − v3))F2(x) − x = 0
(v3 + (v2 − v4))F1(x) − x = v2 − v1 + 2(v3 − v4)
If v4 +(v1 −v3) ≥ v3 +(v2 −v4), although player 1 has a lower value than player 2 in the ﬁrst stage, he
wins the ﬁrst stage with a higher probability than player 2. The reason is that player 1 knows that if he wins
in the ﬁrst stage he will have a high probability to win also in the second stage, since in the second stage he
will have the highest value. Otherwise, if he loses in the ﬁrst stage, he will lose with a high probability in
the second stage as well.
If v4 + (v1 − v3) < v3 + (v2 − v4), player 1 knows that if he wins in the ﬁrst stage he will have the
higher value in the second stage and therefore he will have the higher probability to win in the second stage.
Nevertheless, player 1 wins in the ﬁrst stage with a lower probability than player 2 and he has an expected
payoﬀ of zero in the ﬁrst stage. The reason is that his value in the ﬁrst stage is relatively low and/or his
value in the second stage is not high enough in relation to player 2’s values. Thus, he loses with a higher
probability than his opponent in the ﬁrst stage and after that in the second stage as well.
In contrast to the case of declining values, here we obtain,
Conclusion 2 In sequential two-prize all-pay auctions with two players, if the players’ marginal values are
inclining, the player with the highest marginal value does not necessarily have the higher expected payoﬀ in
the ﬁrst stage, and he may even have an expected payoﬀ of zero.
126 The ﬁrst stage - N players
Up to this point we considered contests with only two players. The generalization to the case with more
than two players is straightforward and we present it for where the marginal values are declining. The
generalization to the case where the marginal values are inclining is similar and therefore it is omitted. It is
important to note that similar to one-prize all-pay auctions with more than two players (see Baye, Kovenock
and de Vries, 1996), in our model with more than two players, the equilibrium strategies are not necessarily
unique. We assume that there are N > 2 players. In the equilibrium that we present, only the three players
1,2, and 3 have an eﬀect on the equilibrium and only 1 and 2 are active. For each player the marginal values
are declining. Assume that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4 are the players’ highest marginal values. Then we have the
following four cases.
6.1 Case C1: V 1 = (v1, ), V 2 = (v2,v3), V 3 = ( , ).
This case is equivalent to case A1 with two players where V 1 = (v1,v4), V 2 = (v2,v3). Thus, like in case A1,





x + v3 − v4
v3
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v4 and u2 = v2 − v4.
6.2 Case C2: V 1 = (v1, v3), V 2 = (v2, ), V 3 = ( , ).
This case is equivalent to case A2 with two players where V 1 = (v1,v3), V 2 = (v2,v4). Thus, like in case A2,
players 1 and 2 randomize on the interval [0,v4] according to their eﬀort cumulative distribution functions,
F1(x) =






The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v4 and u2 = v2 − v4.
136.3 Case C3: V 1 = (v1, ), V 2 = (v2, ),V 3 = (v3, ).
This case is the only one without an equivalent one for the case of two players. In this case, players 1 and 2
randomize on the interval [0,v3] according to their eﬀort cumulative distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x),
which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
v1F2(x) + (v1 − v3)(1 − F2(x)) − x = v1 − v3
v2F1(x) + (v2 − v3)(1 − F1(x)) − x = v2 − v3





The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v3 and u2 = v2 − v3.
6.4 Case C4: V 1 = (v1, v2), V 2 = (v3, ), V 3 = ( , ).
This case is equivalent to case A3 with two players where V 1 = (v1,v2), V 2 = (v3,v4). Thus, like in case
A3, we obtain that:






v2 + v4 − 2v3 + x
v2 − v3 + v4
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 + v2 − 2v3 and u2 = 0.
2) If v2 + v4 < 2v3, players 1 and 2 randomize on the interval [0,v2 + v4 − v3] according to their eﬀort
cumulative distribution functions,
F1(x) =




v2 + v4 − v3
.
The respective expected payoﬀs are u1 = v1 − v4 and u2 = 2v3 − v2 − v4.
As we can see, in sequential two-prize all-pay auctions with more than two players there is always an
equilibrium in which only two players compete in each stage of the contest.
147 Concluding remarks
We analyzed a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a sequential two-prize all-pay auction with two players.
The equilibrium strategies in the second stage are equivalent to those in one-prize all-pay auctions, but
the equilibrium strategies in the ﬁrst stage are more complex. We showed that independent of the players’
values, there is always an equilibrium in which no player decides to quit in the ﬁrst stage and then competes
only for one prize in the second stage. Each of the players, therefore, has a positive chance to win both of
the prizes as well as none of them.
We also showed that if the players’ marginal values are declining, the player with the highest marginal
value, independent of the other marginal values, has the highest expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage. On
the other hand, if the marginal values are inclining, the player with the highest marginal value does not
necessarily have the highest expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage.
The characteristics of the equilibria in one-prize and sequential two-prize all-pay auctions are not the
same. For example, in one-prize all-pay auctions the player with the lowest value necessarily has an expected
payoﬀ of zero for any equilibrium. On the other hand, in sequential two-prize all pay auctions with two players
and declining marginal values, even if a player has two marginal values which are both smaller than those
of his opponent, he may have a positive expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage. Furthermore, while the expected
payoﬀ of the players in the one-prize all-pay auction is obvious, namely, the weaker player has an expected
payoﬀ of zero and the stronger player has an expected payoﬀ equal to the diﬀerence of the players’ values, in
the sequential two-prize all-pay auction the players’ expected payoﬀs as well as their strategies are not clear
at all.
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